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Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms
Saul Levmore*

Why do so many executives and other employees receive fixed stock options as
part of their compensation packages? There is an impressive literature on compensatory
options, and yet it raises more puzzles than it solves. Tax law, option theory, and
agency theory all suggest that we might have expected to find quite different practices
than we do observe. In particular, there is a puzzle in the popularity of conventional
fixed options when indexed options would seem to be relatively attractive. The solution
or story offered here develops arguments about signaling, in the form of employees’
disinclination to be seen as preferring cash over options in their own employer’s future.
It relies on the idea that indexed options encourage more risk alteration, or inefficient
differentiation, than other forms of compensation. And it introduces the notion that
there is something of a norm in favor of nonconflicting fortunes within a community.
The norm part of the argument says something about the more general norm of privacy
with respect to money matters and it illuminates the occasional practice of
confidentiality regarding one’s own compensation. This practice might be stable because
of the negative signals emitted by defectors. The same analysis might help explain why
stock option practices are somewhat sticky.

* * * *
I. Introduction
This article is in part about a puzzle associated with stock options
and employee compensation. Many firms, and virtually all firms in
certain industries, use stock options to form a significant part of the
compensation they pay their more highly compensated employees. These
options could take many forms but there is remarkable conformity around
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the practice of giving a class of employees a large percentage of
compensation (in expected value terms) in the form of options with a
strike price set at or slightly above the underlying stock’s market value at
the time the options are granted. Moreover, this compensation practice
has grown in popularity. It is associated with start-ups, especially with
respect to granting options even to non-managerial employees, but it has
grown to include a majority of traded firms and many employees who,
individually, would seem to have only remote influence on firm profits or
share prices.1
Criticism of this expansion of compensatory options has largely
focused on the market value of these options and the frequent reissue or
revision of options when these options become nearly worthless because
of declines in share prices for the market as a whole or even for the
employer-firm.2 Revisions are defended as necessary to recreate the
incentives and alignment of interests that were present before these
options dropped underwater. But critics fear that agents are somehow
overpaying themselves with options in a way that they could not with

1

See Todd Perry & Mark Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990’s: Shareholder Alignment
or Shareholder Expropriation? 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123, 123-124 (2000) (suggesting that stock
option grants to CEO’s grew some 335% o ver this seven-year period , while CEO salary rose at a rate
only slightly higher than average employee compensation ); Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, The
Impact of Employee Stock Options on the U.S. Lab or M arket (Draft of May 1, 2000) (comp aring use
of stock o ptions grants and realizations for low, middle and high-salary employees and reporting
tripling in realizations from 19 95-9 8); Randall S. T homas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1021, 1024-1028 (2000)
(discussing the current trends in executive compensation).
2

Some of the newer criticism is more closely related to the tack taken here, as it questions
the conventional wisdom that fixed options are tax favored. See Calvin Johnson, infra _; Miller, infra
note _; James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests,
19 Cardo zo L. Rev. 697 (19 97). But see Kevin W iggins, Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income and the
FICA Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Purchase Plans, 53 Tax Law. 703 (2000) (arguing that
desp ite FSA 1999-26034’s drastic changes on how amounts received under an employee stock
purchase plan should be treated for FICA purposes, only the employer-provided discount, and not the
entire option gain, is be subject to FICA.
On the agency problem relationship, see Don M. Chance, Raman Kumar, & Rebecca B.
Todd, The ‘Repricing’ of executive Stock Options, 57 J. Fin. Eco n. 129 (2000 ) (repricing more likely
for firms with greater agency problems, of smaller size, and with insider-dom inated boards). Finally,
for a legal perspective on revisions, see Eric J. W ittenberg, Und erwater Stoc k Op tions: What’s a
Board of Directors to Do? 38 A m. U. L. Rev. 75 (1998 ) (addressing the legal considerations a board
must weigh in deciding to rescind old options and issuing new options at a discount from the current
market price).
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straight compensation. Part II takes prevailing practices and criticisms as
its starting point, comparing conventional stock options to bonus plans
and to indexed options. The discussion pays particular attention to risk
and to tax law. There emerges something of a puzzle as to why
conventional compensatory options are so popular. I refer to this as the
stock option puzzle.
Part III develops the idea that conventional practice may be
explained with a combination of considerations. I describe one of these as
super-risk alteration and another as something of a norm regarding
“nonconflicting fortunes” among similarly situated employees, or within
other communities. These ideas play important roles in part because
employees are, quite explicably, not compensated with instruments that
extract payments from them when the firm does relatively poorly. A third
consideration is signaling. At several points in the analysis, we find that
employees would have trouble bargaining away from prevailing practices
because to do so might send an unpleasant signal that is wisely avoided.
Part IV suggests that the norms portion of the argument is more
plausible than it first seems because a similar norm regarding
nonconflicting fortunes can be found in other settings. I do not insist that
the norms label is critical to the larger explanation regarding
compensation practices. It is possible that the work done by the norms
argument could be done with a related claim about potential efficiency
costs in the face of conflicts among employees. But the norms label does
provide some purchase and the focus, in any event, is on the larger task of
explaining the popularity of conventional stock options. Moreover,
compensation practices seem somewhat sticky and might therefore
themselves be understood as constituting or reflecting various norms.
II. The Stock Option Puzzle
A. Incentive-Compatible Alternatives
1. Compensatory stock options and bonus plans
If there is a puzzle about options, it is in the details rather than the
overall abstraction. The abstract idea is simply to provide employees, and
especially high-level managers, with compensation packages that mitigate
agency costs. Managers who receive straightforward, unadorned salaries
might do what pleases shareholders who hold residual equity claims, if
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only because managers care about their reputations, pay increases, and so
forth. But it is easy to see why shareholders might prefer for
compensation to track performance more directly, and one way to do this
is to tie employee well-being to the firm’s share price. The idea is to
motivate managers with something less than a one-period lag. Of course,
managers might make themselves attractive by bonding themselves
through compensation packages that rise and fall with shareholder value.
Incentive-compatible compensation offers, or ideas, might originate on
either side of the employment bargain.
There are, of course, many ways to align managerial well-being
with shareholders’ (or all investors’) goals. This is hardly the place for a
review of all such alternatives, or for a catalogue of the advantages and
pitfalls of each. But it is useful to visit some obvious alternatives.
Employees of all stripes might be promised bonuses, perhaps at
year’s end, based loosely or tightly on the firm’s profits or the employees’
individual performances, defined and measured one way or another.
Some bonuses, including those paid at many law firms, are neither
specified nor guaranteed in advance, in which case a bonus is much like a
raise – except that the employee can choose to depart immediately after
the bonus is paid and the bonus does not become part of the employee’s
base salary for the purpose of future raises and benefits. In some settings
these bonuses might be better thought of as liquidated damages aimed at
preventing disruptive departures, but there is nothing terribly remarkable
about slightly uncertain ex-post rewards.3

3

It is tempting to dwell also on commissions which can be thought of as a style of bonus.
Comm issions are simply compe nsation that is linked to sales or other outputs thought to be in the
individual’s control, though perhaps a subtle form of profit-sharing. But commissions -- at least as
the (no nlegal) term is norm ally used -- are mo re incre mental than bonuses (which are so metimes all
or nothing in character) and they are often committed to by contract while bonuses are often
discretionary on the emp loyer’s part. I have discussed comm issions elsewhere, and I resist the
temptation to say more here. Fo r the present, the idea is simply that almost anything that can be done
with popular, fixed compensatory options can be accomplished at least as well with well-designed
bonuses and comm issions. And there are some things that are far easier to do with bonuses, including
the design of individualized incentives.
To b e sure, bonuses and commissions are very popular. Even without good data, it is surely
the case that more employees receive income in the form of bonuses and com missions than in the form
of stock options. An optimist might say that we find commissions for low-level employees where
monitoring is best accomplished in terms of some output. Bonuses might require more tailoring and
we find these for mid-level employees. They might be linked to a division’s profits, or loosely linked
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As compared with common stock options, an interesting thing
about typical end-of-period bonuses -- and even, perhaps, voluntary
severance payments made to employees -- is that they can be
individualized even as they are linked to firm performance. A given
employee is likely to perceive that her end-of-year bonus is very sensitive
to the firm’s overall profits but also that it is sensitive to a supervisor’s or
committee’s perception of her individual performance during the
preceding year. Even if the employee reasons that the true aim of the
bonus is to discourage exit and to encourage hard work in the coming
year, there is apt to be a strong correlation between the strength of these
managerial sentiments and the individual’s performance in the completed
year.
Stock options can be designed to be close substitutes for these
conventional bonuses. Employees might simply not know in advance
how many options they will receive at the end of a period, or for that
matter what the exercise price will be. The exercise price and duration
probably need to be set by the employer at the start of the period, so that
employees will see that hard work and firm success during the period
raises the expected value of their options. The number of options each
employee receives -- whether individualized or not – can in principle be

to hours worked an d the firm ’s overall profitability. Finally, stock options can be seen as bonuses for
high-level employees whose efforts affect the entire firm and therefore the stock price. For a more
com plete (and optim istic) description, including som e discu ssion o f employee risk aversion (a topic
discussed beginning in Section _ infra) , see Edward B . Rock & M ichael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims
and Go vernance: T he Fit between Em ployees and Shareholders, in Emp loyees and Corporate
Governance 121, 130 -33 (Margaret M . Blair & Mark J. Ro e eds.). But there are many
counterexamples to this three-part division. And a more pessimistic or puzzling perspective is to
wonder why bonuses could not do whatever the options do. The text goes on to emphasize the
advantage – and relative scarcity – of indexed options which would appear to be more incentivecom patible than conventional fixed options; the latter reward employees for gains they could not have
produced and lose their incentive feature when share prices drop, so that the already granted options
are “out of the mo ney” and incapable of influencing future work effort. Indexed options, like
conventional optio ns, gene rally start out with a specified time period of say three to ten years during
which the holder can buy the underlying stock at the specified exercise price, which is normally set
at the market price at the date o f grant. Exercise might be limited to employees who remain with the
firm and in any event the options are usually nontransferable. The options are of course more valuab le
the longer the option period and the more volatile the underlying stock. With indexed options, the
exercise price normally varies with a benchmark such as the S&P 500 or a basket of stocks in the
issuing firm’s own industry. The idea is to reward the employee when the firm does relatively well
(even if the firm’s stock price had dropped in absolute terms).
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determined at the end of the period based on the employee’s performance.
Employees might then be made indifferent between conventional bonuses
and stock options. Both are expected to rise with the value of the firm,
and both can be individually tailored with something of an ex-post
component if so desired.
These (not quite conventional) stock options -- and others as well -may be inferior to bonuses from both employer and employee
perspectives because of the risk that in the course of the period in question
the price of the firm’s stock will fall. The straightforward case is where
there is a widespread drop in the stock market, so that the decrease in the
expected value of an option could not have been prevented by better
performance on the part of the employee or even by the particular firm as
a whole. The same is true if only this firm’s price falls, but for reasons
unremediable by our targeted employee. The problem is interesting in
part because it is asymmetric. If the market as a whole rises, the employee
still knows that on the margin (assuming the employee can marginally
affect the firm’s stock market price through hard work and so forth) this
firm’s value will rise more than average. But if the market drops, and the
options are well “out of the money,” then employer and employee will
realize that there is no longer any incentive function served by the options
or promise of options. Even the hardest working employee will not bring
the share price into the range that was expected at the time the options
were granted or written. The risk of such drops might be offset by the
grant of more options in the first place, a topic discussed below in Section
II-C, but the incentive effect is more stubborn.
A related problem accompanying downward market movements
concerns the logistics of pay periods. For a variety of well-known reasons,
relating both to practicalities and strategic behavior, employee
compensation is unlikely to depend on the successful completion of a long
period of employment; salaries are likely to be paid in monthly or yet
more frequent installments, and in the event of departures or terminations
they may even be pro-rated on a daily basis. The same will be true of the
options component of the compensation package. As such, if there is a
steep decline in stock prices, then our illustrative employee will feel
undercompensated unless the number of options or their exercise price is
constantly adjusted. The employee who was promised x in salary plus y
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in (the expected value of) options per month will otherwise find offers
from competing firms more attractive.
In fact, firms that use options to fill a significant part of the
compensation package sometimes distribute new options with different
conditions, the most obvious being a lower exercise price, after such a fall
in the market or even a fall in the lone firm’s share price. Critics should
say that this shortchanges non-employee investors. One form of the
critical claim is that the firm can hardly win; the original compensation
package is set with some expectation about market prices. If the market
rises more than expected (apart from gain attributable to the relevant
employees), the employee enjoys a windfall and if the market drops, or
rises less than expected, the employee simply receives new or revised
options. Superficially, this looks too good for the employees.
Even where the firm will not issue new options or revise existing
options when the shares drop in value, the firm can be seen as giving
something away for nothing in a rising market. But since this may be
offset by the employee’s loss in a falling market, I prefer the first version
of the criticism. One way or another, there is a reasonable claim that these
options, or more specifically their exercise prices, should be indexed to the
market as a whole or perhaps to the industry in which the firm competes.4
It is possible that when markets fall, the employer’s ability to revise
conventional options terms is a valuable tool. The employer can cut
wages in this manner (by not revising or resetting the options), and wages
are otherwise thought to be inefficiently sticky. Similarly, employees
might choose to depart and the employer would not want them locked in
because of expectations about their options. At the very least, these ideas
suggest the superiority of conventional options over many bonus plans,
which can easily cause employees to overstay and which may create
problems and even litigation or employers who wish to layoff employees
before their bonuses vest. I will not draw more optimistic conclusions
about the value of – rather than the problem with -- conventional options
in downturns if only because it is unclear who really decides whether to
revise options in downturns.

4

The argument is often traced to Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10
Bell J. Econ. 74, 82-83 (19 79).
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In theory, many arguments of the sort just advanced can be parried
with some claim about well-functioning markets or rational expectations.
If, for example, it is true that there is an asymmetry with regard to the
consequences of market fluctuations for these options, then employers
and employees will perceive this in advance and employers will need to
pay lower salaries (or promise fewer or simply less valuable options) in
the first place. Everyone can assess the contingent value of the options
(and replacement options) because market fluctuations can be quantified
and the probability that the employer will feel compelled to revise or
reissue options can be estimated.
One response to this reaction, that stock options are unlikely to be
too generous (unless all compensation is too generous) because there is
room for adjustment in other components of the compensation package, is
(of course) to insist that markets are unlikely to work so well. It is
particularly hard to estimate the likelihood that new incentives will be
handed out in a declining market. Moreover, if the gist of the criticism is
that fancy compensation packages are hard to evaluate and monitor and
that, therefore, compensatory options allows agents to transfer wealth to
themselves under the guise of the claim that well-aligned incentives are
good for the firm, it must be remembered that stock options are not the
only known fancy form. Agents could use bonus plans and commissions
to hoodwink their unsophisticated principals. Indeed, these may be even
harder to measure -- though perhaps not as easy to revise in the agents’
favor in midstream.
2. Fixed versus indexed options and accounting standards
A more interesting reaction to the claim that stock options, and
even their midstream revisions, do not simply allow agents to fool and
take from their principals because this power will be reflected in the initial
compensation package as employees bid for these packages with lower
salaries, returns us to the question of indexed options. Why are stock
options rarely indexed to market (or industry) prices?5 As already
suggested, this sort of indexing would seem to be efficient because it
would maintain incentives for the relevant employees even when stock

5

See generally Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal
for Compensation Commensurate With Performance, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31 (1997).
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prices fall for reasons beyond their control. Even the most sophisticated
commentators gravitate toward an explanation that focuses on accounting
rules – and therefore on an idea that is inconsistent with an assumption of
well-working markets with well-informed players.6 Under current
accounting standards, a firm that uses conventional, fixed options reports
(to shareholders and the public, as opposed to the tax authorities)
compensation expenses measured on the first date on which both the
number of shares optioned and the option exercise price are known.7 The
expense calculation is then based on the compensatory value of the stock
options -- but this consists only of any spread by which the quoted market
price of the optioned stock exceeds the option’s exercise price. In short,
the time value of the option is essentially ignored.
For example, imagine that an option to purchase 1000 shares on any
date up to January 1, 2002, at an exercise price of 20, is promised to an
employee on January 1, 1997, when the share’s market price is 20.
Imagine that the option is exercised in 2001, when the stock price is 30. In
1997 the firm reports no expense associated with this part of the
compensation package because the spread is zero on January 1, 1997,
when both the number of shares optioned and the exercise price are
known. A firm influenced by accounting conventions may therefore be
disinclined to set the exercise price below the market value at the time of
the grant. Nor is there anything to report some four years later when the
option is exercised. We might think of the firm as reporting a cost of 0 in
2001 because its “cost” is seen as 20 (inasmuch as it could have sold this
stock to the public for 20 at the time it was “promised” to the employee)
but it has received 20 because of the exercise price. Had the exercise price
been 15, the firm would have reported a cost of 5,000 in 1997.
There is of course value given to the employee with this option, and
this is greater the more volatile the share price. The value of this three
year option period could therefore be calculated, but the firm need not do
6

See, e.g., Merton Miller, __; Alfred Rappaport, Misplaced Concerns About Indexed
Op tions, H arvard B usiness R eview 94 (M arch-A pril 19 99).
7
The accounting rules are discussed in Herbert Kraus, Executive Stock Options and Stock
Appreciation Rights §§ 4.01-4.04 (2000); Jill E. Lyons & Patrick S. McG urn, Compensation for
Executives and B road -Based E mplo yee G roup s: Strategy, Design, and Implementation: PerformanceBased Equity Awards: The Road to Real Value, American Law Institute - American Bar Association
Continuing L egal E ducation, SC67 AL I-AB A 17 7 (1998 ).
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so -- except that beginning in 1995, accounting standards required the firm
to disclose via a footnote what impact the options would have had on net
income and on earnings per share if the accounting rules had required a
“fair value” method which would have taken this time value into
account.8 The footnote thus reports not some measure of the value to the
recipient but rather one measure of the opportunity cost to the employer.
An alternative might have been the market value of the options or even
the compensation costs likely “saved” because of the grant of the
incentive-compatible option, which would require some assumptions
about the cost of imposing risk on the option holder.
In contrast, if the option is indexed so that the exercise price rises
and falls with a market basket, for instance, then the exercise prices is not
known on January 1, 1997 but is only known upon exercise. At that time
the firm will need to report its cost based on the spread. In our example,
when the options are exercised in year 2001, the firm will now “know”
that the cost to it was (30-20)1000, or 10,000.
The claim, as is now obvious, is that the parties shy away from
indexed, or other variable, options because they must report greater
expenses and then show smaller profits than they do if they deploy
conventional fixed options. Fixed options allow the firm to avoid
reporting the cost of the time value portion of the option, although the
footnote requires a different ex ante cost estimate. Nor is an ex post
expense reporting required regardless of the actual dilution brought about
by exercise. Indeed, the firm can substitute fixed options for cash
compensation not only to generate hard work on the employee’s part but
also to avoid the appearance of expenses.9
Variable compensatory options do require an accounting for their
time value (and cost) in ex post fashion by awaiting exercise. The firm will
not on average look better by substituting variable options for salary,

8
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The argument could also be extended to revisions in the event of downturns. When
compensatory optio ns are underwater and the employer resets the exercise price, it is (I suppose)
arguable that the employer prefers to do this rather than to offer other bonuses for future performance
or other incentives because only the revision alternative escapes record ation as an exp ense. The re is,
however, a proposal to reclassify these options as variable rather than fixed if the exercise price is
reset. See APB O pinion No. 25 (1972) (Accounting Principles Board); Stateme nt of Fin ancial
Accounting Standards No. 123 (1995) (Financial Accounting Standards Board).
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though the incentives offered by these options may make them attractive.
The ex ante fair value method, required at most at the level of footnotes,
asks the firm to report both salaries and option values up front. If indexed
options seem to dominate fixed options as a matter of incentive
compatibility, but we find that fixed options actually dominate (as they
do), then we might explain the apparent puzzle with the observation
about accounting rules. Firms appear to benefit by “hiding” the true cost
of compensating their employees.
There are other examples or putative explanations in corporate law
and in finance that depend on accounting rules – and therefore to a degree
on the belief that investors are easily fooled. Fully informed, rational
investors would see the benefit of indexed options, if any, and would
realize that despite the accounting convention associated with
conventional options, there is a formidable cost associated with selling
shares at the exercise price when they could be sold elsewhere for more
(or when they need not be sold at all in which case existing equity owners
would share profits fewer ways). In short, the prevailing explanation for
the use of conventional rather than indexed compensatory options
depends on a substantial degree of investor ignorance and this in turn
makes it difficult to argue that we should not be concerned when options
are readily revised in bear markets.10 Even if these revisions or reissues
are rationally expected so that the employer gives less value up front in
conventional options, there is a puzzle in the uncertainty when more
straightforward indexed options and bonuses are available.11
We might turn now to a different explanation for conventional
options. But the puzzle is made clearer and perhaps deepened by first
exploring taxes and risk aversion.
B. Taxes and the Options Puzzle
One can imagine a tax code that unambiguously encourages stock
options. Strong enough encouragement for fixed options, or for any other
10

Note that I am not disp uting the id ea that given fixed compensatory options, there will be
occasions when it is sensible to revise o r “reset” them. See V iral A. Acharya , Kose John, &
Rangarajan K. Sundaram, O n the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options, 57 J. Fin. Econ.
65 (2000). These authors also review some of the criticism of revision, id. at 66.
11

Accounting standards would of course require reporting the costs of these bonuses. See
Paul He aly, T he Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Disclosure, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 85, 106
(1985).
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form of compensation, can surely explain a preference by actual taxpayers
for the form in question. The discussion thus far has discussed the relative
attraction of indexed options in a tax-neutral world.
Imagine, for instance, that employers could deduct not only the
cost of cash compensation but also the current value of stock options
granted to employees. And imagine that employees were not taxed on
this sort of compensation until (and only if) options were exercised in
order to ascertain their value to the employee (who might for example
need to wait for some conditions to pass before the options vested).
Similarly, employees might defer tax until they sell the underlying stock.
In these cases there would be a substantial mismatch between the
employer’s deductions and the employees’ income and it is easy to see
that the parties might bargain (or evolve) toward pay packages that
included a good deal of this sort of currency. Tax reformers might try to
limit employers’ deductions or might seek to deny the employees opentransaction treatment, but meanwhile we would expect to see a great deal
of the tax-favored options.
But our present tax system hardly goes this far. Section 422 of the
Internal Revenue Code allows an employee to receive and eventually to
sell qualified incentive stock options, recognizing only capital gain on sale,
whereas compensation is normally taxed as ordinary income. The
qualifications include an annual limit of $100,000 (measured in the
underlying stock), a requirement that the exercise price be no less than the
market price at the time of the grant, and a holding period of at least two
years after the date of grant and one year after the date of exercise. The
employer, however, has no deduction.12 Without this last rule,
compensatory options would obviously be attractive, and many observers
are quick to assume that compensatory options are indeed tax-favored.
We can understand any favorable tax treatment associated with
qualifying incentive options as reflecting the idea that the holding period
(and the other terms of the option) is necessary for incentive compatibility
but that it is something of an “imposition” on the employee because cash
would be more attractive; the employee could always to choose to invest
cash in the employer’s stock, and such normal stock would be perfectly
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IRC §42 1(a)(2).
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alienable. We can also challenge any favorable treatment with the
observation that if the employee regards incentive-compatible
compensation as less attractive than ordinary income, then the market will
force employers to give more of this incentive-laden currency. The right
treatment might be something in between (adjusting even for the
employee’s unusual risk, as discussed presently) but this is sufficiently
complicated that the Code tries to compromise, perhaps, with the $100,000
limitation.
In any event, the treatment associated with qualified options can
not explain why indexed options are not more popular. Even if the
market price falls and the indexed exercise prices drops, the options
qualify because the “option price is not less than the fair market value of
the stock at the time such option is granted.”13
In the case of a nonqualifying option of “readily ascertainable
value,” the employee has income equal to the fair market value of the
options received at the time they are granted.14 If value is not readily
ascertainable at grant time, generally because this is not a widely traded
stock, then the employee waits until exercise or disposition and reports
the difference between receipts and cost (exercise price) at that time.15 At
the time the employee has income, the employer has a deduction.16 Note
that if the exercise price were lower than the market value at the time of
the grant, the employee would again have income in the same amount as
the employer’s deduction -- even though the employer is using its own
stock in which it is ordinarily treated as having no basis. Thus far these
options may seem harmless in tax terms or perhaps mildly advantaged
compared to cash.
It is misleading to focus on putative tax advantages for the optionholding employee, when the real issue is whether the combined taxes of
employer and employee make one form of compensation relatively
attractive. Returning to qualifying incentive stock options for example, in
the event of an eventual exercise following appreciation of the underlying

13

IRC §42 2(b)(5).

14

Reg. §1.83-7(a).

15

Id.

16

IRC §83 (h).
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stock and the approaching end of the option period (including employee
departure, perhaps), the employee has capital gain rather than ordinary
income – but the employer has no deduction at all. Similarly, if the
employer repurchases the stock from the employee, the employee has
capital gain in most cases but the employer has no deduction. Within a
broad range of assumptions, the tradeoff is a poor deal in terms of tax
planning.17 Compensatory options of this sort are likely to be tax
disadvantaged rather than advantaged, as is commonly supposed.
In the case of nonqualifying options, the employee can be seen as
taxed on the time value and volatility value of options at the time of grant
or exercise or disposition. There is a corresponding deduction to the
employer, but this merely duplicates the match that is available for most
employer expenses, including straight compensation. And, to repeat,
qualifying incentive stock options do offer an apparent advantage to the
employee in the form of deferred capital gain, but this advantage is easily
overwhelmed by the fact that the employer has no deduction at all. I
think it fair to conclude that, at least in most cases, if rational wellinformed players (including shareholders at large) choose to use options
to compensate certain employees, it must be because of their incentive
effects rather than any tax advantages. Bonuses would provide
deductions (as well as matching ordinary income).
Moreover, it continues to be quite puzzling that indexed options
are not more popular. They would offer the same perceived tax
advantages as conventional options – and the same more likely
disadvantage – and they would seem superior in terms of incentive
effects.18 Put slightly differently, instead of giving an option worth $50,000
to an employee, the employer could sell stock or equivalent options to
outside investors, receive this money tax free (because no gain is
recognized on the sale of the issuer’s own stock), and then pay the receipts
to the employee, perhaps in the form of a bonus or deferred compensation
tailored to whatever outputs or inputs seemed appropriate as a matter of
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Leaving aside the possibility that they help the contraction process in the event of
downturns. See __.
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incentives. The employee is taxed on the whole amount at, say, 39%, but
the employer has a deduction at its marginal rate of, perhaps, 35%.
At the risk of stating the obvious, we can at least understand the
relative popularity of qualifying compensatory options, even (or
especially) for low-level employees – though perhaps not un-indexed
options – in Silicon Valley and other start-up hotbeds. If the employer has
no need for deductions at present, then converting employee ordinary
income into capital gain (where, once again, there is no cost to losing the
employer’s deduction) is quite attractive. Taxpaying firms do not gain
from offering secretaries qualifying stock options because the employee’s
capital gain is normally more than offset by the employer’s loss of the
deduction. But a start-up firm with no expected tax liability in the near
future is much happier to give up deductions in order to profit (through
lower overall wage bills) from giving secretaries capital gain rather
ordinary income with respect to some of their compensation package.19
Calvin Johnson goes much further.20 He would have us recognize
the superior performance of equity over debt, and then have us confess
that firms that use stock as compensation are essentially choosing the most
expensive way of paying future cash. They are giving up shares that on
average will prove very valuable. He therefore finds the use of
compensatory options to be startling and absurd. I do not subscribe to
this view, though my reasons do require some reliance on a belief in wellfunctioning markets.21 And my purpose here does not, in any event,
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There is obviously much more to be said here, and my analysis is meant only as a first cut.
My aim is to offer a story about the popularity of fixed rather than indexed compensatory options,
ideally with som e norms-thinking mixed in, and I think it clear tha t tax law does not exp lain this
options puzzle. In any event, I can count on my com mentator to p ursue the tax angle and intuitions.
20

Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Comp ensation: The M ost Expensive W ay to Pay Future Cash,
85 T ax N otes 351 (199 9).
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The easiest case is to imagine that employees can take their pay in the form of employer
debt and turn it into employer equity. Mo re generally, Johnson, id., compares stock optio ns with
employer debt, though he also explo res the choice between stock (or stock op tions) an d cash. His
focus on “future cash” may be practical to the extent that one reaction to the stock option puzzle is that
many start-up firm s do not have cash. Johnson d iscusses the question o f whether the tax law would
recognize these firms’ debt as entitled to interest deductions and the like. But this is not the place to
dwell on all aspects of Johnson’s provocative work. It is the fact that taxes no t only do not explain
the taste for compensatory fixed options, but make the puzzle of their popularity greater, that is
important here.
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require association with all of the Johnson view. It is enough to see that
tax law is unlikely to explain employers’ taste for conventional stock
options as a means of paying compensation. That tax law may actually
raise the cost of this form of compensation simply adds to the puzzle
already before us.
C. Risk Aversion and Compensatory Options
1. Risk premiums, employees, and landlords
Compensatory options, included in pay packages in order to align
incentives, can seem very expensive especially when markets rise and the
options are valued ex post. A fair amount of the finance literature
understands this expense as a function of risk averse employees.22 The
idea is that a firm might gain by “forcing” employees to accept pay in the
form of stock options, which align the interests of employees and
shareholders and encourage a more valuable firm, but employees might
require much more in the way of these options than they would in straight
pay because the options force them to hold a risky undiversified portfolio.
A typical upper-level manager might find half her compensation in this
one basket, so to speak.23 One can even go so far as to show that insiders,
who hold substantial wealth in the form of unexercised stock options with
respect to their employer’s stock, might sell stock (when permitted to do
so or when able to avoid detection) even though they know that the firm’s
future is better than expected.24 The idea is that the gains from
diversification exceed the benefits of the inside information, which is to
say the knowledge that the expected value or mean return of the stock is
favorable.
One implication of this perspective is that we might understand a
firm’s disinclination to extend compensatory options to nonmanagerial
employees as reflecting the point that these options would be very costly
22

See, e.g., Hall & K evin M urphy, Op timal Exercise P rices for Exec utive Stock O ptions,

__ (199 9).
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And much more than that for chief executive officers. [cite data]
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See Lisa K. Meulbroe k, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding
the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (Harvard B usiness School Working Pap er 2000).
A less exciting p oint is that a substantial fraction of em ployee held stock options are exercised soon
after they vest, at the cost of sacrificing much of their time value but presumably to diversify away
from the emp loyer-firm. See Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, Employees Stock Options Exercises: An
Empirical Analysis, 21 J. Accounting & Eco n. 5 (1996).
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to the firm because employees of modest wealth might require especially
large premiums to hold (what would amount to) extremely undiversified
portfolios. This fortifies the conventional wisdom that front-line
employees might be better motivated by bonuses or commissions that
have something to do with their assignment than by options which reflect
stock prices well beyond their influence. Of course the general point
about risk and compensatory options is that narrowly-tailored bonuses
might be far superior to conventional options from the employee’s
perspective, and therefore one would think that employers would regard
bonuses as a less expensive means to their end.25
I should add that where it is common for mid-level and upper-level
employees to receive compensatory stock or stock options, we will always
be able to explain the use of such options in compensating lower-level
employees, or for that matter suppliers, including landlords. In some
settings, firms might reason that employee morale will suffer if relative
income diverges from some baseline. Secretaries may resent rather than
support managers who earn millions of dollars from their executive stock
options, and it might be thought wise to “force” options on the secretaries.
The risks may not be the same for all these employees, but some sense of
shared fortune may promote a sense of community, loyalty, and hard
work.26
Stock options for landlords in lieu of straight lease payments might
also incorporate something of an indexing component.27 In a place like
Silicon Valley, when a typical tenant is a firm with volatile value and
prospects, it is likely that other local firms rise and fall with one’s tenant.
Demand for real estate is likely to be highly correlated with most potential
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It goes almost without saying that some readers will at every turn of the road intuit that
options are pop ular precisely because the y transfer wealth inefficiently or un fairly or simply
unnecessarily from employer to employee. Perhaps high-level employees can fool their p rincipa ls with
argum ents about incentives and thereby acquire enormously valuable options where they could not
have emerged with equivalent bonuses and the like. My inclination is to look harder for an
explanation o f prevailing compensation p ackages.
26

I do not put much weight on this idea here, although I do develop the shared fortune idea
in a slightly different context below in Section III-D and Part IV.
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Som e of these “rental” stock options appear to encourage patience on the landlo rd’s pa rt,
because the op tion ends if the landlords ends the lease arrangement and brings in a new tenant. But
others simply give the landlord a stake in the tenant’s upside return. See _.
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tenants’ stock values. If the overall trend is believed to be upward,
landlords may be more inclined to agree to long leases if they can acquire
options in the local industry or, more simply, in the present tenant. We
should therefore expect options-as-rent to be more common in longer
leases.28 Again, however, the tenant-firm that uses options to pay for real
estate space is losing an opportunity to enjoy tax deductions because the
firm’s basis in its own stock is zero. But if this firm has no immediate tax
liability, deductions are useful only in the creation of carryforward losses
which will be useful down the road. In short, it is probably not surprising
to find options-as-rent where there is a local volatile industry, where the
tenant has no present tax liability, and where landlords (more than most
employees) can diversify their portfolios. These characteristics may help
form a better understanding of tenant-landlord payments than the
conventional observation that start-ups are cash poor and unable to
borrow, and thus forced to give out options in their futures. The question
of course is why employees and landlords sometimes take options rather
than debt.
In the case of employees (rather than landlords or suppliers), it
goes almost without saying that if compensatory options are somewhat
puzzling, and part of the puzzle is their cost (because of tax considerations
on the employer’s part and risk considerations on the part of the
employee or other recipient), the puzzle would really be out of control if
the options did not do something positive in the way of aligning
incentives. As such, we should expect the options to offer a long period
for exercise, or we should find contractual requirements that neither the
options nor the acquired stock be sold for some time. We might also
expect rules barring these option-holding employees from escaping the
incentives – and the serious nondiversification costs – by fiddling on their
own with other financial instruments that can offset the impact of the
compensatory options themselves.29
28

Alternatively, to the extent that longer option periods increase the value of the option, we
may find landlords bargaining for longer leases when part of their compensation is in option form,
and the op tion ends when the landlord-tenant relationships ends.
29

On this subject, and for the idea that the contractual rules might be hard to enforce and
might in any event be much firmer than they are at present, and also reinforced by incentivecompatible tax law , see David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum.. L. Rev. 440 (2000). The available evidence suggests that
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2. Risk and indexed options
a. Risk to the employee (and cost to the employer)
The focus in this Section on risk has the potential to illuminate the
puzzle of why indexed compensatory options are not more popular.
Accounting tricks aside, these indexed options would seem to have more
bite and less waste than conventional options (though perhaps they are
not superior in this regard to well-drafted bonuses) in the quest for
incentive-compatible compensation. But now we have the added notion
that it is expensive for employers to impose risky options on employees.
The employers do so, the argument goes, to create incentives, but they
must increase overall pay in order to compensate their employees for the
additional risk the employees bear as a result of the incentive-compatible
options. The employees value these options far less than does the market
because other market participants can hold more diversified portfolios.
For these employees, a serious incentive amounts to a much larger
position in the firm than an outsider with this wealth would take.
With this is in mind, perhaps we can explain the scarcity of indexed
options with the claim that an equivalent value of these indexed options
would impose even more risk on employees, so that an employer who
sought to use indexed options for incentive reasons would need to
transfer even more value to the employees as compensation for the risk
imposed upon them. Apparently, or so the novel argument might go, this
additional compensation is not worth the added incentive.
The idea is plausible and depends on an employer-firm’s volatility,
its beta (which is to say correlation with the risk of the stock market as a
whole), and the likelihood and character of revisions of conventional
options in downturns. One can imagine a conventional option that is in
the money for the employee in a state of the world where the firm does
well because or while the market does well. For illustrative (nontechnical)
purposes, we might think of the employee as estimating that this will
occur one in three times. But an indexed option requires that the firm
does better than the benchmark, which this example takes to be the

contractual restrictions are fairly rare. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEOs
Bargain For? An Empirical Study of Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts, (Draft of Oct. 31,
2000) (reporting that 62 of 93 samp led co ntracts with CE Os d iscussed stock o ption com pensation, 8
restricted sale of options, with 3 of these restricting pledging and 0 restricting hedging transactions).
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market as a whole. It is true that if we hold constant the share of
compensation filled by options, the indexed option will need to cover
many more shares than the fixed option. But these numerous options
might only be in the money one in eight times, perhaps. If the employee
and the employer are hoping for the tax treatment associated with
qualified options, perhaps because the employer has no present tax
liability, then the employee must hold the options and the stock for some
time, so that even if the firm’s fortunes and the market’s swings are such
that at various points the options are in the money, the chance that it will
be so by the time the required holding period ends is less. It is possible,
then, that the indexed options look much riskier than apparently
equivalent conventional options.30 In turn, the firm will need to give more
of them, or to give more straight salary than otherwise required in a wellfunctioning market.
If this claim holds, we will have come a long way toward solving
the puzzle of the relative popularity of conventional compensatory fixed
options over their seemingly superior cousins, indexed options. Indeed,
we may in passing have also explained the dominance of conventional
options over bonuses inasmuch as the best-tailored bonuses for incentive
purposes may be a great deal like indexed options. The more the
employer promises large bonuses based on many things going well, the
more risk there is to the employee. Even conventional commissions can be
quite risky for the best salesperson; sales may do poorly because of
economic conditions or because the firm’s product is inferior and so forth.
Most incentive-compatible pieces of compensation add risk for the
employee, and the employer will need to pay the employee more in order
to gain agreement (or attract employees).
Readers familiar with the finance literature will have already
recognized some flaws in this argument, or at least some offsetting
considerations. One reason to think that indexed options do not raise the
employer’s cost to prohibitive levels is that because these options may be
more efficient in creating incentives, the employer may need less of them
(in value terms). By deploying indexed options, the overall compensation
package may now have more straight compensation than one with
30

[Explain idea that relative performance might wander in and out of the money more than
conventional op tions.]
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conventional options. This line of reasoning adds of course to the puzzle
of the relative infrequency with which indexed compensatory options are
found. Indeed, the central puzzle discussed here is why indexed
compensatory options are not more popular than conventional options,
when it is these indexed options that would seem to offer better incentives
with less risk.
A second, more important reason to think that indexed options are
less risky than conventional ones and that the scarcity of this incentiveefficient tool remains puzzling, is that since these options take aim at the
firm’s performance net of the market (or industry benchmark), the
employee’s risk reflects only firm-specific risk. For firms across a large
beta range, conventional, fixed options are risky largely because the
market as a whole is risky. If the indexed option eliminates the market
risk then it would seem to follow that the holder is left with less risk.
But there is a significant problem with this argument associating
indexed options with lower employee risk. It is that when conventional
options are entirely out of the money because the market as a whole has
dropped, it is not uncommon for the employer to alter the exercise price,
grant new options, or reissue the options for much longer periods or with
other changes. Indeed, much of the criticism of compensatory options is
focused on these revisions which tend to be more common where agency
costs are most serious.31 Indexed options would seem to spark revision
much less likely if at all. In the extreme case, if an employee always
expects revision of the conventional option deal when the market drops,
the fact that indexed options eliminate market risk does not necessarily
alter the relative risk picture.
A third (and related) reason for thinking that indexed options are
less risky, is that with indexed options there is only firm-specific risk and
this is more easily diversified away by the employee who might buy stock
or options in other firms. It is market risk that the employee cannot
escape; to the extent that these options, or well designed bonuses, impose
firm-specific risk, it can be managed through portfolio adjustment.32
31

[cites needed. See Finance symposium]
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A sloppier but more intuitive way to think of this is that indexed options offer rewards
when the market as a w hole dro ps so long as the particular emp loyer’s stock drop s less than the
market. Meanwhile conventional options will be out of the money. As such, indexed options reward
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But this avenue of risk reduction is most unlikely, and not simply
because the employee may not have sufficient wealth to fiddle in this
manner. The important point is that the employer-firm will eventually
contract to try to prevent this diversification. In most cases, the incentivecompatibility is powerful only if the employee’s firm-specific risk is in fact
dramatically increased.
Imagine for example that firms A and B compete in the
manufacture and sale of aircraft, so that the revenues of either firm are
normally at the expense of the other. If A gives its managers indexed
options in A, and the manager can rid herself of firm-specific risk by
entering the other “side” of the market in financial instruments with
respect to A, or the manager can do this by investing in financial
instruments associated with the stock of aircraft manufacturer B (which
does well when A does poorly), then the very (incentive-based) idea of the
compensatory options will be defeated. As noted earlier, there is
important work on this subject and it is possible that firms (and tax law)
do not do enough to prevent this maneuver by their options-receiving
employees.33 It might, for example, be very difficult to monitor these
employees investments, especially the investments in instruments
associated with another firm’s stock. I will not therefore insist that this
firm-specific risk cannot be eliminated by the employee, but it is probably
fair to say that this argument does not eliminate the possibility that
indexed options may be riskier than conventional options.
Still, all these ideas seem rather modest compared to the central
argument that indexed options would seem to offer much better
incentives than conventional options while at the same time imposing less
risk on the employee because systematic risk is eliminated. This is of
course the stock option puzzle with which we began.
b. Super-risk alteration introduced

less often when the market rises, but since they can also reward when the market falls, they are less
risky than at first ap parent. A conventional option might produce rewards one in three times (ignoring
the varying magnitude of the reward ) while an indexed option produced upside rewards bu t one in
eight times -- but then a lso rewards in a down market p erhap s another on e in eight times.
33

Note in passing that if employees can eliminate this firm-specific risk and, in the case of
conventional optio ns, if they can eliminate more risk than that, then the emp loyer will find that it can
impo se its com pensatory o ptions at lower cost – albeit because there is less of an incentive effect.
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There is another risk to consider, and it is one that plays an
important role in the argument which follows. It is that indexed options
pose a special danger because they encourage or tempt option-holding
managers to push the firm to riskier (but lower expected-value) options.
This is of course true for conventional options, but it a more serious
problem with indexed options, and that is why I refer to the risk as one of
super-risk alteration.34 These options are of greater value when the firm is
more volatile, and employees might therefore wish to trade-off expected
value for volatility. In some cases the employer will be able to monitor
and penalize such risk alteration, but in other cases it will be
unobservable, or difficult to sort out. I return to this presently, but the
idea is to focus not only on the employer’s need to offer more
compensation in order to induce the employee to accept risk in the form of
options or stock in the employer-firm but also on the cost to the employer
of monitoring the employee or absorbing the cost of poorer performance
by the firm as it is influenced by these option-holding employees. With
indexed options it is harder than ever to truly align the interests of
employees and other investors.
Interested readers can investigate the magnitude of this risk with
respect to a given employee and with regard to a variety of instruments
that might be used to motivate the employee.35 My aim here does not
require a conviction that risk is at the heart of the case for or against
indexed options. I have simply tried to set the stage for a new theory of
why we find so many conventional options by raising considerable doubt
as to whether we understand their popularity. If we do not, then we can
put the blame on high agency costs and selfish managers. We might
simply say that the burden shifts to favor the idea that managers take for
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It can also be a more serious problem with other nonconventional options. See Shane A.
Johnson & Yisong S. T ian, The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option
Plans, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 13-15 (2000).
Generally speaking, conventional op tions encourage risk alteration of the sort that increases
the firm’s beta, while indexed options encourage differentiation from the benchmark. It seems more
likely that executives and other employees can influence the degree of differentiation (from the
benchmark chosen by the employer) than the firm’s beta. If so, the super-risk alteration explanation
in the text (for the popularity of conventional rather than indexed options) is reenforced.
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The matter is recognized in Johnson & Tian, supra note _, at _ (discussing risk-alteration
effect for a number of instruments), although the finance literature hardly emphasizes the problem.
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themselves and their friends at the expense of shareholders (and even at
the costs of society if options encourage inefficient volatility). That this
transfer is in the form of options rather than straighter compensation
might simply be attributed to the ability of managers to explain to
shareholders and legislators the advantages of incentive-compatible
compensation – and then the concurrent necessity of raising pay or
granting more options than might first seem necessary to compensate
options-receiving employees not only for the replaced salary but also the
increased risk imposed on them. But for readers who prefer to think that
markets work reasonably well, it is unlikely that agents can so easily fool
their principals, who are hardly all amateurs. The question then is
whether we can develop a better story about the popularity of
conventional stock options. As we will see, the idea of super-risk
alteration plays a critical role in this story.
III. Compensation Norms
A. Getting Started (with Some Form of Compensation)
My story of the evolution to conventional but not to indexed
options relies somewhat on the idea that compensation practices are
somewhat sticky and that experimentation with new forms of pay and
incentives somewhat difficult. To be sure, rational employers (and
employees) might forecast the stickiness and therefore hesitate to
experiment in the first place. But this sort of irreversibility36 is
paradoxically difficult to avoid, for avoidance means no experimentation
in the first place.37
Imagine a firm that pays its employees in cash -- though a purist
might ask for some theory as to how that currency, or baseline, became so
popular. It is fairly easy to see how such a firm might (or might not)
come to substitute some common fringe benefits, including some
conventional stock options, for cash or for subsequent pay increases. In
the case of traditional fringe benefits, marginal employees or a large

36

See Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and O ther Organizations,
18 J. Corp. Law 33 3 (1993 ).
37

[explain that we might start with all cash and then any move precludes later
experimentation, so we are stuck with first innovation which might still be better than no innovation
at all.]

25

majority of all employees might give up wages of 100 in order to accept
benefits they value at 105, but that cost their employer (and are valued in
the marketplace at) 95. In many cases, the gain comes from collective
acquisition. Thus, workplace amenities, pensions, and health insurance
might be less expensive when acquired by or for a group of employees,
and the employer solves a collective action problem by providing the
benefit and imposing it on all employees.38 In many cases, tax law adds to
or provides the differential by allowing purchase by the employer out of
pre-tax dollars. The employer receives a deduction for this expense just as
it does for straight cash compensation, while the employees are not taxed
on the value of the benefits they receive, though of course they would
have been taxed on cash. In some cases these employees would have
partial deductions if they purchased these goods for themselves, but in
many cases they would not, if only because of statutory floors or a
precondition that they itemize and so forth.39
There is obviously nothing remotely mysterious about the
evolution toward fringe-benefit-laden compensation packages. Indeed, if
tax law is too friendly, employers and employees might agree on benefits
that they would otherwise not purchase. Nor is it entirely surprising to
find some employers who resist these new packages. These employers
might appeal to potential employees who value the benefits in question
less than most.
Compensatory stock options might themselves have just such a
genesis, because tax law once made them fairly attractive.40 But this is an
awkward story to pursue because it implies unusual stickiness with
respect to some benefits and not others. Expensive Christmas gifts to
employees all but disappeared after tax law changed to exempt only de
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The collective action approach can also explain how tax law limits the revenue loss by
using a nondiscrimination requirement. See J ulie A. R oin, U nited T hey Stand, D ivided They Fall:
Public Choice The ory and the Tax Cod e, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 62 (1988 ).
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Of course, we might imag ine that with different practices, po litical pressure wo uld build
to make these recipient-level deductions more readily available.
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Prior to Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), employees who received option
grants were treated as receiving a “proprietary interest” in their employers rather than compensation.
As will become clear, even this will be unfavo rable for som e taxpayers who prefer the emp loyer’s
deduction associated with ordinary compensation.
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minimis gifts from the employees’ income;41 we might have expected
compensatory stock options to wilt rather than to flourish.
B. Bargaining as Signaling
Stock options are not more cheaply provided collectively, and we
have already seen that tax law might be put aside or even marshaled in
favor of the idea that options not be used as compensation. Still, it might
be easy to explain the introduction of incentive-compatible elements to the
compensation package, whether in the form of bonuses, stock, or options.
The parties reason that the pie might grow with such incentives and so
they agree to share the gains from this substitution, even though some
undesirable risk is imposed on virtually all recipients. If employees do not
wish to accept the risk unless compensated in the form of higher overall
wages (including fringe benefits), or a risk premium, the employer might
choose to impose the risk at this cost in order to gain its share of the still
greater product. With a variety of assumptions we can easily imagine
some evolution to bonuses and to compensatory options.
But imagine that an employee’s own risk attitude, or own portfolio,
means that this employee would very much prefer cash to options. The
employee thinks that she could make this change in a way that saves the
employer considerable expense. Perhaps on average the employer is
offering a good combination of incentives and (costly) risk, but this
employee knows that she is out of the ordinary. The problem is that if the
employee suggests a tailored alteration (or an alteration for all employees)
the employer might see this as a signal that the employee has less than
average confidence in her own work effort, in the firm’s prospects, in her
own likelihood of staying at the firm long enough to benefit from the
options, and so forth. The employee may be fearful of making a mutually
beneficial offer because to do so is send a confusing signal. The employer
will not know the employee’s motivation, and on average the message is
negative.
Nor will it do much good for the employer to initiate the deal and
to offer stock options and cash as alternative forms of compensation, in
search of those employees who would take on the options in return for the
most modest risk premiums. It is true that employees can accept or reject
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See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 68-71 (19 99).
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this form of payment according to their own risk preferences and ability to
diversify with other wealth, but there will again be the fear that the
employer will interpret the employee’s choice in a negative manner. It
might even be unwise for the employer to offer the choice with some
acoustical separation in place in order to promise that the employer will
never know which employees have accepted which packages. Even if the
obvious logistical problems could be solved, the employer might lose from
the self-selection by employees. Indeed, in a world where many
employers offer stock options, the remaining employers must be anxious
that they will attract employees who plan to put in low work effort or to
turn over rapidly before options vest. Optimistic employers might hope
to get those employees who simply do not like risk, but it may be hard to
separate these groups. Moreover, within a single firm, employees who
choose cash over options may not only be signaling their likely departure
or their low self-assessment, but also their own predictions about the
firm’s future. Managers or principals may wish to repel rather than attract
such employees, and employees will not want to send these signals.42
Even if the employee would accept a good deal less in cash than in
options, the employee will hesitate to reveal this fact to the employer.
Employers might also affirmatively seek employees who like risk.
These employees, as managers, may help the shareholders engage in risk
alteration at creditors’ expense. There is a significant fear that managers
are too risk averse for shareholders’ tastes. 43 More generally, the very
point of options may be to align the incentives of these employees and the
firm’s shareholders. If generic managers are thought to be risk averse,
empire-building, and salary protecting characters, firms will not want to
attract the most risk-averse managers. They will prefer to look for signs
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At the risk of repetition, an employee may wish to bargain with the employer, offering cost
savings in return for less risk, but the dan ger is that the employer will read her as displaying a
propensity to shirk, an expectation that she will soon depart from the firm (before any holding period
or option period ends), inside information or simply an inclination to believe that the firm is in worse
shape than the market knows, and even nothing more than serious risk aversion which the employer
might see as incompatible with the culture of the business. This step is not only familiar by now but
also fairly intuitive; if executives were offered stock op tions in lieu of cash (and with a market value
exceeding the cash alternative) we wo uld expect few executives to have the courage (or foolishness)
to turn down the options in favor of the cash.
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that their employees are unusual risk takers, and in turn they can attract
such managers by offering stock options instead of cash. Meanwhile,
rational employees will again decline to ask for cash instead of stock.
The argument is much the same for employees at all levels. A
corporate board is unlikely to think much of an executive who prefers
cash to options on the firm’s future upside. All the more so if market
pressures have already caused the board, as employer, to build in
something of a risk premium for the options.44
C. Indexed Options Revisited
1. The problem
It would seem then that employees and employers should move
rather quickly to indexed options. Employees would signal even more
faith in themselves and the firm, while employers would locate risktaking, confident employees. The stock option puzzle now looms larger
than before.
By way of review, one offsetting possibility is that both sides realize
that it is too difficult to enforce a contractual prohibition against
diversifying away the firm-specific risk. All employees can feign interest
in firm-specific, or indexed, options, while in reality purchasing on their
own instruments that offset these indexed options. As we have seen, it is
more difficult to diversify away that which conventional options impose.45
Another reaction to the renewed puzzle is that to the extent that
indexed options decrease an employee’s risk by eliminating systematic risk,
then employees might give the wrong signal by encouraging a move from
conventional to indexed options. But this seems unlikely not only because
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It is not as if the employer can offer less valuable options in lieu of cash and attract or
retain employees who fear that they will send negative signals. Other employers will offer cash,
limited only by the self selectio n pro blems which will be fairly sm all until there is a considerable risk
premium in the comp ensation offered by employers who co mpensate with cash and o ptions.
45

I do not mean to minimize the problem of emplo yers’ ensuring that emplo yees with
conventional options do not escape the intended incentives. But this is a problem discussed elsewhere.
See, e.g., Schizer, supra note __. The point here is that it is easier to diversify away firm-specific risk
so that, sans prohibitions by enforceable contracts or by legal regimes (including insider trading laws
and tax law d iscouragem ents), em ployees will be m ore likely to unburd en themselves o f the risk
associated with indexed options than they would with fixed options. But the problem discussed in the
text is not limited to indexed options. Note also that diversifying away firm-specific risk might be
costly. Compe nsatory options have fairly long time horizons (for both incentive and tax reasons), and
an emp loyee might therefore need to m ake numerous offsetting investments.
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they would also send a positive signal about their own work effort and
their own confidence in the firm’s relative performance, but also because
the package can be weighted more heavily toward options than before.
Another signaling possibility is that the firm fears that indexed options
will fail to attract employees who believe that the industry is especially
promising. This too seems unlikely or unimportant because these
potential employees can (by contract or otherwise) invest in the industry
in tandem with their firm-specific options. Finally, the employer-firm
might fear that a move to indexed options will signal that the firm predicts
gloom for the industry (or other benchmark) so that it avoids conventional
options because these will soon be underwater and useless as incentives.
This seems to be a weak explanation ofthe stock option puzzle because the
firm can simply index to the market asa whole, and it does not have
special information about this benchmark.
In any event, the signaling idea helps us understand the evolution,
if it is that, from salary to bonuses and then to stock or stock options. It is
difficult for employees to decline this sort of risk. And if the firm does not
offer such risky compensation, relatively uninformed employees might
themselves take it as a signal that upper-level employees (who generally
set the agenda for the directors) do not think much of the firm’s future.
The same may be true for employer debt, which can of course be
offered as part of the compensation package. Not only might
shareholders be disinclined to offer debt instead of cash, for fear that their
employees will run the firm in a way that pleases creditors more than
equity holders,46 but also employees might hesitate to ask for debt
because, once again, this implies some lack of faith in the firm’s future.47
The harder task is to explain the disinclination to move from
conventional to indexed options.48 It is to this part of the puzzle that the
discussion now turns.

46

[Refer briefly to the usual Jensen-M eckling argum ent.]

47

In any event, following Jensen & Meckling, we might simply say that fringe benefits
related to retirement income already give the employees enough of a debt position, and that this debt
is the most tax advantaged kind.
48

I set aside the possibility that employees do not wish to suggest indexed options for fear
of looking too risk averse. This can be offset by asking that a greater fraction of comp ensatio n be in
indexed-option form than in conventional fixed option form.
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2. Super-risk alteration and over-differentiation with
indexing
We have already seen the idea that indexed options might
encourage an employee to differentiate with respect to the benchmark in
an inefficient manner.49 My claim here is that shareholders must worry
that if many employees hold indexed options, there will be too much risk
alteration and differentiation, even to the point where the best projects in
expected value terms are passed over in favor of riskier choices. I will call
this problem that of super-risk alteration because it is much more than the
usual problem creditors have with shareholders50 and more than the risk
alteration problem shareholders have with employees who hold
conventional stock options – as these employees will also prefer more
volatile projects than will shareholders at large. Employees with indexed
options are in the money when their firm does better than the market (or
industry) – and this is more likely to happen when the firm takes chances
that other firms do not. They are in the money on the upside when the
firm exceeds the market (or the industry or whatever the benchmark) and
they are also rewarded on the downside if the firm drops but does so less
than the benchmark.
It is also useful to think of (indexed) options as asymmetric calls; if
the firm does better than the market, the holder-employee gains, but if the
firm does worse than the market, the same employee does not emerge with
negative income. It is this asymmetry that encourages extreme
differentiation, or super-risk alteration. Imagine, for example, that an
executive regards the employer-firm as on track to perform like the rest of
the industry, apart from slight variations to be caused by individual work
effort. This executive now has the opportunity to differentiate the firm by
guiding it toward a radical product design. There is a one in three chance
of stupendous success and a two-thirds chance of equally dramatic failure.
If this executive holds a large number of indexed options, he will be
tempted by the chance of great rewards. Plainly, this super-risk alteration
arises because the executive holds options rather than indexed securities;
there is no obligation to make payments to the firm in the event that the

49
50

See supra Section II.C.2.b.
[cite Triantis discussion]
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design flops. To ask an employee to take such a position in the firm,
which is to say to hold a kind of symmetrical, indexed security for
incentive purposes, would require not only substantial monitoring to
ensure that the employee did not escape this risk but also so much more in
the way of compensation as to make the cost prohibitive to the employer.51
The indexed-option-laden employee will therefore be tempted to commit
the firm to much riskier projects than shareholders would like. These
projects may come with lower expected values than others available to the
firm, but the employee is looking for any reasonable chance of beating the
market. If all executives in a firm, or a substantial fraction of all its
employees, hold indexed options, it seems likely that the super-risk
alteration problem will be grave. Put differently, indexed options in the
hands of all executives might induce terrific work effort, but it would so at
too great a cost in terms of the losses to the firm from investing in projects
of a high risk, differentiated, and relatively low expected value character.
Of course, not all employees are in a position to commit the firm to
such (inefficient and) risky endeavors. Some employees may not have such
responsibilities and others may be easy to monitor. Moreover, some
employees, or even some of these employees, may be more averse to the
risk associated with conventional stock options offered by the firm. The
puzzle then is why these employees do not bargain for indexed options, or
why the firm does not selectively offer indexed options to these employees.
The prospect of indexed options in the hands of all employees may be too
costly in terms of super-risk alteration. But it would seem more
manageable for the employer to have selected employees with indexed
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And the employee may simply be thought unable to pa y when the firm does p oorly. No te
that I continue to assume that if indexed optio ns are su perior on incentive-comp atibility grounds, then
the employer will not want the employee to escape the risk by diversifying. This seems to be a
reasonable assumption although alternatives are plausible. T he easiest case is where, as before, the
employee would diversify by investing in a competitor whose value was negative correlated with the
employer. See supra __ (a ircraft manufac turer examp le with zero-sum prospects). The alternative is
that there may be occasions (or industries) in which hard work by an employee raises all ships. The
employee may, for exam ple, wo rk hard to develop equip ment that enab les all aircraft to land and
takeo ff in terrible weathe r. This emp loyee w ill work even ha rder if she profits not only from employer
A’s increased value but also from c omp etitor B’s increased value when B copies or buys the new
technology from A. But I will imagine that this is unusual and that in most cases when an employer
indexes to a benchmark, it prefers that its employee not avoid the comparison by diversifying away
the risk.
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options while most received and held conventional options. The puzzle is
reenforced by the fact that the conventionally compensated employees
would help in monitoring the indexed employees, or would at least control
the likelihood that the decisionmaking process became too skewed in favor
of high risk projects that aimed to differentiate this firm from the
benchmark of the industry or the market as a whole. In short, the
remaining puzzle is why we do not find selected employees receiving
indexed rather than fixed options.
3. Norms
We arrive finally at the potential for effective norms. To begin, it is
tempting in a norms conference to launch the idea that we have a norm
against “talking about money” and that this explains why neither
employee nor employer suggests indexed options. But of course this alone
will not explain our puzzle because conventional options, commissions,
and some bonus systems are hugely popular even thought they must be
somehow initiated and even though they generate conversations about
money around the water cooler and in the executive dining room.
We need norms only to explain the disinclination to offer indexed
options to a subset of executives or employees, because we have already
seen the problem with indexed options for all. It is useful first to recall that
these indexed options will be in the money even when the firm does poorly
in absolute terms, so long as it does better than the benchmark. Imagine
now one situation in this sort of downturn; both the firm and the economy
as a whole have experienced a bad period in absolute terms, but the firm is
doing better than the benchmark. Most executives (and other optionholding employees) are well out of the money with their conventional
options. Yet those with indexed options – if selected members of the group
were offered indexed options -- would be celebrating their good fortune.
My sense is that there is frequently a norm that might be described
as everyone in a group rising or falling together, at least to the extent
necessary to prevent conflicts within the group. To the extent that
institutions can be designed so that members of a single community do not
find that some rise while others fall, life will be easier together. To be sure,
a community might not want to share their fortunes when it would be
sensible to diversify risks. But to the extent that they are similarly situated
there is something of a norm against advertising the presence of conflicting
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fortunes. It would be awkward or even unacceptable for some executives
to celebrate their new wealth while others did poorly because their
conventional options were well underwater.
Readers who share this intuition about the arrangement of
“nonconflicting fortunes” will now have a complete picture. Employers do
not offer indexed options to all employees in the targeted class, even
though this would impose less risk and be less expensive and more
incentive compatible, because of the problem of super-risk alteration and
over-differentiation. And they do not offer indexed options to selected
employees in this class, such as those willing to accept less pay in return for
less risk, because this would violate the norm of nonconflicting fortunes.52
Most readers will find this claim too convenient or too weak in the
face of the advantages of satisfying different preferences within a group or
simply diversifying risk.53 I try to improve upon it (in the next Section)
with some additional evidence of such a norm. The more this
nonconflicting-fortunes norm is found, the more plausible it is that it
explains practices with respect to employee compensation. But first it is
useful to make a few observations in order to complete the story offered
here.
It is unlikely that the firm could avoid the super-risk alteration
problem associated with giving indexed options to all employees in the
class by substituting upside-indexed options that paid when the firm
exceeded the benchmark in an upside market but did not pay when the
firm did poorly in absolute terms, even though it outperformed the

52

I am not claiming that all employees must be paid the same. This is obviously a rare
practice. Instead the claim is that one executive’s pa y will not be nega tively correlated with ano ther’s
except perhaps when they are in plainly advantageo us compe tition for p rizes or promotio ns.
Note that for a variety of reasons, it makes sense to think of a legal fiction, such as a
corporate employer, abiding by a norm. The entity might itself profit from establishing a reputation
that grows with confo rming to a no rm; the entity is associated with individuals who cannot escape the
norms and reputational attachments they have absorbed; and the entity might abide by norms because
its employees or customers are prone to respond to signals in certain ways.
53
But note that this community of executives is not normally one that wo uld gain from risk
diversification among its members. It is not as if we expect most executives of firm A to subsidize the
college education of other A executives’ children if the latter group does poo rly. In contrast, members
of a small town might benefit by not having their children in one army regiment and this sort of
diversification, at the expense of camaraderie and the norm of nonconflicting fortunes, might well be
desired.
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benchmark. Such a semi-indexed, or upside-indexed, option would
impose even more risk on the employee than conventional options, and
would come at such a grave price to the firm as to make it (perhaps)
prohibitive. Moreover, this sort of option would eliminate the risk
alteration problem. The employee would still prefer much more volatility
than most shareholders and peer employees with conventional options.
This employee will continue to try and differentiate the firm from its peers
in ways that other investors would not want. Only by extracting money
from the employee in the event the project does poorly will the employee
internalize the shareholders’ preferences. And this sort of arrangement,
amounting to an indexed security or indexed compensation, would, as
discussed earlier, surely impose too much risk.
In short, with a variety of tools we are able to understand the
popularity of conventional compensatory options and even the
disinclination to offer some indexed options. These indexed options could
both reduce risk for the employees in question and provide superior work
incentives, but employees who sought to be part of this indexing would not
only be signaling their aversion to risk (which may be a negative signal)
but also would be asking to be rewarded in a manner not correlated (and
sometimes negatively correlated) with their peers. When the firm rose
with the market, the conventional option holders would celebrate while the
indexed option holders would receive nothing. Only when the market did
very well and the firm did even better would the two groups have
comparable fortunes. And when the indexed option holders were in the
money because the firm’s share price dropped less than the market as a
whole, the indexed option holders would do well while the conventional
group would be out of the money -- lobbying for revision of the option
terms and the like. I am comfortable with the claim or social observation
that many workplaces, and perhaps virtually all workplaces, could not
tolerate such tension among peers. I think it fair to call this a norm,
although it is possible to stress instead (or equivalently) the possible
conflicts that would arise among the differently compensated groups and
to insist that these conflicts simply create inefficiencies that are overcome
by declining to introduce any indexed options. The norm perspective
looks better, I think, when we think of the nonconflicting fortunes norm as
of a piece with other norms about compensation and money.

35

D. Bonuses Revisited
Before turning to these other, related norms it is useful to return to
bonuses for some confirmation of the arguments offered here. At various
points I have suggested ways in which bonuses might duplicate the
incentive and risk characteristics of (fixed or indexed) options, and in some
instances bonuses might appear inferior or superior as a component in a
compensation package. Two additional points are now worth adding.
First, to the extent that bonuses are tied ex ante or ex post, whether by
contract or by practice, to firm-specific performance, these bonuses impose
risk on the employee but also generate risk alteration problems for the
employer. We might say that bonuses often duplicate indexed options, so
that both compensation tools create problems of risk alteration and
excessive differentiation. In fact, most bonus systems probably fall in
between conventional and indexed options. The expected bonus is greater
as the firm does better in absolute terms, but there is room for reward
based on firm-specific performance. The bonus might duplicate the
compensation package of an employee who held a mixture of fixed and
indexed compensatory options. Bonuses are like conventional options in
that their value is linked to the absolute value (or profits) of the firm, but of
course this means that the link is to both the market as a whole and the
firm as a relative performer. To the extent that the bonus rises with the
relative profits or value of the employer-firm, the super-risk alteration
problem is present. With most bonuses, this problem is not as great as it is
when the employee is given comparable value in indexed options alone.
We might simply note a small new puzzle, namely the apparent fact that
more executives are not offered some mixture of conventional and indexed
options.
Bonuses also run the risk of creating tension by violating the norm
of nonconflicting fortunes. To the extent that an advantage of bonuses is
that they can be individually tailored, perhaps according to the
responsibilities of the given employee, there is the danger of nonconflicting
fortunes. Of course this danger has an element of healthy competition or
monitoring to it. Thus, if executive are rewarded based on the sales or
profits of their respective divisions, then they may spend time arguing
about the allocation of costs common to their divisions, or they may decline
to pursue policies that are good for the firm as a whole, but not cost
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effective in terms of the bonus keyed to one particular division. In
principle, these conflicts can be solved, indeed, mediated with perfectly
tailored bonus schemes, but in practice there are likely to be tensions. The
nonconflicting-fortunes norms might in this way “explain” or be reflected
in the practice of offering relatively uniform bonuses, which is to say that
bonuses are not nearly as individualized as might first seem appropriate
from an incentive-compatibility perspective. In any event, note that
bonuses can be awarded ex post, with or without discretion, and in the
currency of options, fixed or indexed.
IV. Speaking of Money
On its own, the preceding claim about compensation norms may be
unpersuasive. It is simply a weak story about why we do not find some
employees bargaining with the employer to substitute indexed options for
conventional options.54 It is not at all obvious that it is a better story than
that offered, for instance, by the fact that accounting standards discriminate
between fixed and indexed options.55 But the norms story is strengthened
once we recognize the familiarity of the idea that there is something of a
norm not to bargain or even to speak about money when one’s fellows may
have conflicting or disparate fortunes.
It will do no good to point to the etiquette of not speaking about
money quite generally. Children may be taught that a family’s income and
the value of a family’s assets are things to be kept private, but of course
there is plenty of money-talk in the workplace and in some places surely
much discussion about the current value of conventional compensatory
options. The trick continues to be to explain the use of conventional
options when compensating all of a firm’s executives, or even most of its
employees, but the absence of the alternative of indexed options for some.

54

Perhaps we should be explaining why they do not bargain for more cash and more
indexing, for such a package might replicate the incentive compatibility of the conventional option
package at lower cost. But if the employer wants the employee to take on a position as risky as that
created by the conventional option package, and the employer is confident in its ability to control risk
alteration against the interests of (even) the shareholders, then there may be more substitution of
indexed options for cash.
55

See supra _ (noting that the accounting explanation requires an assumption of ignorant or
irrational investors).
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Why is that in our culture we are taught not to discuss money? We
hesitate to reveal the cost of our houses, our salaries, the extent of our
stock-holdings, the size of our income tax, the value of the gifts we receive
or give, and so forth. In some cases we see interest in such topics as
revealing an overly materialistic, perhaps selfish person. The norm against
being such a person is fairly easy to explain. But the norm about moneytalk extends to include discussion of how much money one gives to
charity. To be sure, we reveal and even publish contributions to specific
charities. But when we know that X gave $10,000 to a charity’s campaign,
we generally have no idea what X gave to all charities that year. The
published number provides some information perhaps. An interested
member of the audience might identify with X’s professional status, or
reason that X lives in a house valued about the same as the reader, and this
observer might therefore see that X, at least, values this charity in a certain
way. Much as I like to know how much a colleague is spending on a
Christmas gift for a secretary we both work with, I would like to know
how much this colleague contributes to our children’s school’s fundraising
campaign.
A narrower and accurate description of the norm is, I think, that we
are taught not to discuss money when to do so highlights inequality and
conflicting fortunes. We seek to avoid unpleasant comparisons and envy,
but we encourage group solidarity even at the expense of the risk of envy.
The more our fortunes are correlated with our listeners’, the more moneytalk is acceptable. In these cases, talking about money signals solidarity
and mutual effort rather than greed and condescension. Thus, neighbors
might discuss recent real estate tax assessments, but otherwise not discuss
home values or even renovation costs with acquaintances who live in other
neighborhoods. Many law professors would be more inclined to divulge
their salaries to friends who worked as lawyers than to friends who teach
at their or other law schools. In this case, envy and ill-feeling is more likely
inside the community.
This nonconflicting-fortunes norm may be closely related to the
interesting norm surrounding confidentiality about salaries. In some
workplaces, employers ask or even “require” employees to refrain from
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sharing information about their compensation.56 In some cases employees
might be given information about average raises alongside their own, but
otherwise disclosure is discouraged. This employer preference can be
understood as promoting solidarity, because it is thought to lessen envy
and the like, and employees abide by the wishes of the employer to a
remarkable degree. Of course, a skeptic would say that the employer
requests confidentiality because the employer enjoys its monopsony and
prefers that employees delude themselves into thinking they are well
treated. The employer may also prefer that employees have less
information with which to come asking for increased salaries as individuals
or as a group.
One cost to the employer (and perhaps to the employee) is that
silence mutes the signals that the employer can send to individual
employees. An employee who receives a low increase in a given year
might not recognize the signal for what it is, without information about the
increases bestowed on peer employees whose work effort and relationships
our employee can observe. Knowledge about the average increase helps
somewhat but, without information about the distribution of increases, its
value is limited. Presumably, most employers who request confidentiality
choose not to offer full information of this sort on grounds that the
information itself will spark too much curiosity about the identity of those
who did and did not receive certain treatments. On the other hand, it is
barely possible that most employees, or at least those on both margins, are
well aware of compensation levels at competing firms if only because they
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In fact, it is unlikely that employers can force silence on their employees. There are cases
in which the employer made confidentiality more than a suggestion and then fired an employee who
violated the rule. It appears tha t a well-advised employee-plaintiff can do well by arguing that the
speech was a part of organizing emp loyees or that it was part of collecting information for another
legal claim. Compare Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (reversing part of NLRB findings that enforcing a rule of silence (though not with respect
to compensation) was an unfair labor practice but implying that some restrictions would be acceptable)
and Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976) (opining that discussion about wage s could
be protected, concerted activity as necessary to further the goal of organizational activity, even where
the confidentiality policy had been in effect for many years p rior to the organizing campaign) with
W illiams v. Columbia/HC A H ealth Care Corp., No. 98-2084, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914 (D. Kan.
1999) (finding for defendant who fired an employee because she discussed her salary with another
employee).
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receive or seek offers from these other employers. In such case, the cost of
the confidentiality norm is low.
Note that here too we might expect a sticky practice because of
signaling considerations. An employee who thinks the confidentiality
norm unwise, or who perceives great gain from information-sharing, will
hesitate to defy the employer, even by talking with another employee.
Noncompliance is dangerous because it might be understood as a signal
that one is a troublemaker, regularly disgruntled, eager to promote envy
and discord, or contemplating exit.57 It may even be costly to ask the
employer to reconsider the confidentiality instruction, because the inquiry
itself might be understood as a sign of discontent or lack of faith in the
employer’s centralized compensation-setting function. Much as an
employee will not want to ask for substitution away from conventional
options to straight salary (even at lower cost to the employer), the
employee will not want to ask for an end to the confidentiality instruction.
Most employees would not even be the first to suggest that their
employer put a suggestion box in the workplace, because to do so risks
signaling a belief that the employer is imperfect or difficult to approach.
The same employees will hardly question the wisdom or fairness of
confidentiality rules, and they would surely not ask to be relieved of the
risk of conventional compensatory options.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that confidentiality is successfully
imposed on, or suggested to, relatively small, cohesive workplaces. If this
is the case, then it strengthens the norms claim just advanced. Faculty
members, for example, are in some places part of a lock-step salary system
based on seniority, in which case they surely have nonconflicting
fortunes.58 Where their pay is individualized, a confidentiality norm is
often in place (at least so much as possible until there is publication by
third parties and the like) and we can see this practice as aiming to
maintain the sense of community. These employees are asked not to speak
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Ironically, it is possible that the confidentiality practice increases the chance of exit as it
limits an em ployee’s opportunity for “vo ice.”
58

In som e cases it is tempting to go so far as to say that if a group is unlikely to abide by
confidentiality, perhaps because it regards the employer as an adversary not to be trusted, then the
employer and the group may be wise to insist on lock-step compensation in order to promote group
solidarity. This turn around the usual directio n of the cause and effect.
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about money precisely where talk might produce envy and might
emphasize the fact that to some degree one faculty member’s raise comes
at the expense of another.
V. Conclusion
It is easy to explain the move from salaries to salaries with some
bonuses and then to a package of salaries alongside stock and then to
salary with conventional stock options, though it would not be surprising
to find a move back to bonus plans of varying complexity. It is harder to
explain the apparent dominance of conventional stock options over
indexed stock options. The conventional explanation focuses on
accounting treatments, but this sort of explanation defies normal
assumptions about rational investors.
I have tried here to heighten the puzzle of conventional stock
options and then to solve it. Tax and risk-premium considerations
probably deepen the puzzle, although in passing there is an explanation for
the popularity of conventional stock options even for low-level employees
in some firms, namely those with no present tax liability.
But the failure of firms completely to substitute indexed options for
conventional options can be explained with the danger that indexed
options will cause agents to engage in what I have called super-risk
alteration, or even inefficient differentiation of the firm as compared to
benchmark firms. This problem arises because it is thought to be too costly
for the employer-firm to impose indexed securities, as opposed to
asymmetrical options, on employees; the options encourage dangerous
differentiation because the holder-employees do not pay when the firm
does relatively poorly.
This leaves the puzzle of why indexed options are not offered to, or
bargained for, by the subset of employees who are easiest to monitor or
most eager eliminate the systematic risk associated with conventional
options. Here the solution lies in signaling and in the apparent norm of
nonconflicting fortunes. Employees hesitate to decline conventional
options because they might be seen as shirkers, early departures, skeptics
about the firm, or unattractively risk averse. And the firm might hesitate to
offer indexed options alongside conventional options because to do so
would create tension among employees. We do not talk about money
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when to do so highlights inequalities, and coexisting options of this sort
would create just such inequalities and the envy that goes along with it.
In the end, only a modest fraction of the compensation story offered
here relies on norms thinking. Signaling and super-risk alteration play
larger roles. But the overall story is a new one and the role played by
norms in understanding the stock option puzzle is a useful opportunity for
thinking about the more general norm about money talk.

42

Readers with comments should address them to:
Saul Levmore
Willaim B. Graham Professor of Law
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
s-levmore@uchicago.edu

43

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other Unpublished Works: An
Econ om ic Ap proach (July 1991).
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T . J. Hoop er: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of
Tort (A ugust 199 1).
Cass R. Sun stein, On Prop erty and C onstitutionalism (Septem ber 1991 ).
Richard A . Posner, Blackm ail, Privacy, and Freedo m o f Contract (February 1992).
Randal C . Picker, Security Interests, Misbehav ior, and Com mo n Poo ls (February 199 2).
Tom as J. Philipson & Richard A . Posner, Op timal Reg ulation of A ID S (April 19 92).
Dou glas G. Baird, Rev isiting Auction s in Chap ter 11 (Ap ril 1992).
W illiam M . Landes, Sequ ential versus Un itary Trials: An Eco nom ic Analysis (July 1 992).
William M . Landes & Richard A . Posner, The Influence of Econom ics on Law: A Q uantitative
Study (A ugust 199 2).
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey With An
Analy sis of U.S. Policy (Septem ber 1992 ).
Dou glas G. Baird, 199 2 Katz Lectu re: Reconstructing C ontracts (No vembe r 1992).
Gary S. Be cker, The E conom ic Way of Loo king at Life (January 1 993).
J. Mark R amsey er, Credibly C om mitting to Efficien cy W ages: Cotton S pinning C artels in
Impe rial Japan (M arch 1993 ).
Cass R. Sun stein, Endog enou s Preferences, Enviro nme ntal Law (A pril 1993 ).
Richard A . Posner, W hat Do Ju dges and Justices Maxim ize? (The Sam e Thing E veryone Else
Doe s) (April 199 3).
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and
Firm-S pecific Hu man C apital (Aug ust 1993).
J. Mark R amsey er, Explicit Reasons fo r Implicit Co ntracts: The Legal Lo gic to the Japanese M ain
Bank S ystem (A ugust 199 3).
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication
(Septem ber 1993 ).
Kenn eth W . Dam, The Eco nom ic Und erpinning s of Patent Law (Septem ber 1993 ).
Alan O . Sykes, An Intro duction to Regression Analy sis (October 199 3).
Richard A . Epstein, The U biquity of the Ben efit Principle (M arch 1994 ).
Randal C . Picker, An Introd uction to G ame T heory an d the Law (June 199 4).
W illiam M . Landes, Co unterclaim s: An Eco nom ic Analysis (June 1994).
J. Mark R amsey er, The M arket for Child ren: Eviden ce from Early M odern Japan (Au gust 1994 ).
Robert H . Gertner and G eoffrey P. M iller, Settlement Escro ws (A ugust 199 4).
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of
Softw are (Aug ust 1994).
Cass R. Sun stein, Rules and R ulelessness, (October 1 994).
David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (Decem ber 1994 ).
Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime Consumption
(January 199 5).
Dou glas G. Baird, Th e Law and Eco nom ics of Con tract Damag es (February 19 95).
Dan iel Ke ssler, Thom as M eites, and Geo ffrey P. Miller, Exp laining Deviations fro m the Fifty
Percent Ru le: A M ultimo dal A ppro ach to the Selection of Cases for L itigation (Marc h 1995 ).
Geo ffrey P. M iller, Das Kapital: Solvenc y Regu lation of the A merican Business E nterprise (Ap ril
1995).

44

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Richard C raswell, Freed om of Co ntract (Augu st 1995).
J. Mark R amsey er, Public Cho ice (No vembe r 1995).
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology (November
1995).
Cass R. Sun stein, Social No rms and Social Ro les (January 199 6).
J. Mark R amsey er and Eric B . Rasmuse n, Judicial Indep enden ce in Civil Law Regim es:
Econ om etrics from Japan (January 199 6).
Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make Good
Neig hbors? (M arch 1996 ).
Cass R. Sun stein, The Co st-Benefit State (May 1996).
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the
Ow nership o f Wo rks of Art and Other C ollectibles (July 1996 ).
John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed
Hand guns (A ugust 199 6).
Cass R. Sun stein, Health-H ealth Tradeo ffs (Septembe r 1996).
G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics of
Financially D istressed Firms (M arch 1997 ).
Richard A . Posner, Co mm unity, W ealth, and Equ ality (March 1 997).
W illiam M . Landes, The Art of Law and Eco nom ics: An A utobiograp hical Essay (M arch 1997 ).
Cass R. Sun stein, Behavioral A nalysis of Law (April 19 97).
John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from
California’s State Legislative Race s (May 1997).
Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of
No rms (June 1997).
Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through the Lens of
Laissez-Faire (A ugu st 1997).
Cass R . Sunste in, Dan iel Kahnem an, and David Schk ade, A ssessing Pun itive Damages (w ith
Notes on Co gnition and Valuatio n in L aw) (December 1 997 ).
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation
An alysis of Fed eral C ourts of Ap peals Jud ges (Janu ary 1 998 ).
John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Cam paign Expenditures are Increasing: The
Go vern ment is Getting Bigger (Februar y 19 98).
Richard A . Posner, Value s and Co nsequen ces: An Introd uction to E conom ic Analysis o f Law
(M arch 199 8).
Denise D iPasquale and Edw ard L. Glaese r, Incentives and Social C apital: Are H om eow ners
Better C itizen s? (A pril 199 8).
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Econ om ics (May 1998).
John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping H and Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police
Dep artments, and C rime (M ay 1998 ).
Cass R. Sun stein and Ed na Ullm ann-M argalit, Second-O rder D ecisions (June 1 998).
Jonathan M . Karpoff and John R. Lo tt, Jr., Punitive Dam ages: Their D eterminan ts, Effects on Firm
Value, and the Impact o f Suprem e Co urt and C ongressio nal Attem pts to Lim it Aw ards (July
1998).
Kenn eth W . Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (A ugust 199 8).
John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of
Government? (September 1998)
Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 1998)
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law (November 1998)

45

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law (November
1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December 1998)
Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A “Third Way”
(January 1999)
Richard A. Posner, An Econom ic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February 1999)
Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods (February 1999)
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February 1999)
Gertrud M . Fremling an d Richard A. Posn er, Status Signaling and the Law , with Particular
Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999)
Jonathan M . Karpoff, John R . Lott, Jr., and G raeme Rankine, En vironm ental Violation s, Legal
Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999)
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 1999)
John R. Lo tt, Jr. and W illiam M . Land es, M ultiple Victim Public Sho oting, Bom bings, and Rig htto-Carry C oncealed Hand gun L aws: Co ntrasting Private and Pu blic Law E nforcem ent (Ap ril
1999)
Lisa Bernstein, The Q uestion able Em pirical B asis o f Article 2’s Inc orp oration Strate gy: A
Preliminary Study (May 1999)
Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again (May 1999)
W illiam M . Landes, W inning the A rt Lottery: The Ec onom ic Returns to the G anz Co llection (M ay
1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?
(June 1999)
Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of
Technological Change (June 1999)
David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999)
Eric A . Posner, A T heory o f Contract Law under C ondition s of Radical Jud icial Error (A ugust
1999)
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman,
Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages
(September 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999)
Richard A . Posner, The T heory an d Practice of C itations Analysis, w ith Special Refere nce to Law
and Economics (September 1999)
Rand al C. Pic ker, Re gulatin g N etwo rk Ind ustries: A Loo k at Intel (October 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 1999)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal Decisionmaking: The
Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October 1999)
Gertrud M . Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal Characteristics
(November 1999)
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted (November 1999)
Richard A . Posner, Orw ell versus Hu xley: Econo mics, Tech nology, Privacy, and Satire
(November 1999)
David A. W eisbach, Should the Tax Law R equire Current Accrual of Interest on Derivative
Financial Instruments? (December 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999)
Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000)

46

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Karen E ggleston, Eric A . Posner, and R ichard Zec khauser, Sim plicity and C om plexity in
Con tracts (January 2000)
Dou glas G. Baird an d Ro bert K. Rasm ussen, Boy d’s Legacy an d Blackston e’s Ghost (February
2000)
David Schkad e, Cass R . Sunste in, Dan iel Kahnem an, De liberating abou t Dollars: The Sever ity
Shift (February 2000)
Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing No rms, with Special Reference
to Sanctions (March 2000)
Dou glas Lichtm an, Property R ights in Em erging Platform Techno logies (A pril 2000 )
Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May 2000)
David A . Weisbach, A n Econ om ic Analysis o f Anti-Tax A voidance Law s (May 2000)
Cass R. Sun stein, Hum an Behavio r and the Law of W ork (June 2 000)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000)
Robert H . Frank and C ass R. Sunstein, Co st-Benefit Analy sis and Relative Po sition (Au gust 2000 )
Eric A . Posner, Law and the Em otions (Sep tember 20 00)
Cass R. Sun stein, Cost-Bene fit Default Principles (O ctober 2000 )
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, The Dormant Comm erce Clause and the Internet (November
2000)
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (No vember 2000)
Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System
(November 2000)
Jack L. G old smith an d E ric A . Posner, M oral and Leg al Rh etoric in Internatio nal R elatio ns: A
Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000)
William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December 2000)

47

